[1]The interaction of phylogenetic endowment and ontogenetic experience is not modeled in connectionist neural nets that lack analogues of genetically provided neuroembryological dispositions. "Structured connectionism" might attend to ways in which these dispositions contribute to the structure of knowledge and consciousness as they develop under ontogenetic experience. Unstructured connectionism--the training of random nets--stands open to objections laid traditionally against associationism.

2The immediate question arises, by what exact process might patterns of brain activity come into being that correspond to patterns in experience? See, for example, Cowan & Sharp, 1998, page 102: "The Boltzmann machine learning process is autoassociative or unsupervised, depends only on correlations between pairs of units, and creates in the set of connection weights a distributed representation of the correlations that exist in and between members of the set of stimulus patterns. To put it another way, a Boltzmann machine can form a representation that eventually reproduces relations between classes of events in its environment. It therefore provides a possible solution to Marr's problem of how to construct such representations ab initio in the granule cells of the hippocampus and the neocortex. More generally, it provides a way in which distributed representations of abstract symbols can be formed and therefore permits the investigation by means of adaptive neural nets of symbolic reasoning."

[3]"Usage, which is our teacher everywhere, is so particularly in regard to metaphors. Usage, in fact, clothes almost all conceptions in metaphor, and that with such a sure touch that we are hardly conscious of it. It calls a voice 'silvery,' a man 'keen,' a character 'rugged,' a speaker 'long,' and so on with metaphors in general." (Demetrius, 1932, 2:86, page 359). The Greek word <= sunÆyeia, here translated as "usage" means "everyday language," "habit," "common usage"; etymologically, it means "that which we live by."

[4]"Homer could call the lower slope of Ida its 'foot,' but he could not go further and call a man's foot his 'slope.'" (Demetrius, 1932, section 2:79, page 353.)

[5]"Some things are, however, expressed with greater clearness and precision by means of metaphors than by means of the precise terms themselves: as 'the battle shuddered.' No change of phrase could, by the employment of precise terms, convey the meaning with greater truth or clearness." (Demetrius, 1932, section 2.82, page 355.) The word "truth" here is not a mistranslation. The original is élhydeg.steron, comparative of élhy<<w, "truly," adverbial form of élhyÆw, "true, real, actual."

[6]Demetrius talks of linguistic constructions being "rounded," "disjointed," "hastening towards a definite goal as runners do when they leave the starting-place," "circular," "tense," "periodic," and so on. He points out that thought comes with part-whole structure that can be mirrored in the linguistic construction. (Demetrius, 1932, section 1:1-2, pages 295-7.) We would now refer to this mirroring as iconic syntax. He writes, "The form of the oratorical period is tense and circular; it needs a neatly rounded mouth and a hand which follows closely each movement of the rhythm." (Demetrius, 1932, section 1:20, page 311.) He comments on the experiential or image-schematic basis of our reaction to syntactic constructions, as in, "Long journeys are shortened by a succession of inns, while desolate paths, even when the distances are short, give the impression of length. Precisely the same principle will apply also in the case of members [linguistic constructions]" (Demetrius, 1932, section 2:46, page 331.)

[7]"So we find that a figure is always most effective when it conceals the very fact of its being a figure." (Longinus, 1932, section 17, page 185.)